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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act' lists ten categories of
debts which are excepted from discharge.2 The standard of proof neces-
sary to establish the nondischargeability3 of debts under this section
was until recently unclear. The problem stemmed from the fact that
neither the Code nor its legislative history directly addressed the issue.
Both the bankruptcy courts and the appellate courts were split on the
appropriate standard to apply. However, the controversy was resolved
by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Grogan v.
Garner.4 The question before the Court was whether exceptions to dis-
charge under Bankruptcy Code section 523(a) must be proven by a
'preponderance of the evidence' standard or by a 'clear and convincing
evidence' standard.5 Although the underlying case6 only involved the
1. Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), (codified
at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-2075 (1988)) [hereinafter referred to as the Code].
2. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1988).
3. The reference to debts excepted from discharge as debts that are "nondis-
chargeable" appears in the legislative history of the Code. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 364, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5963, 6319-20.
4. Grogan v. Garner, 111 S. Ct. 654 (1991) The Court announced its decision on
January 15, 1991.
5. Id. at 656.
6. In re Garner, 881 F.2d 579 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. granted sub nom. Grogan v.
Garner, 110 S. Ct. 1945 (1990). Oral arguments were held on October 29, 1990.
Although the particular facts of Garner are not essential to an understanding of
this article, they may aid the reader in appreciating the context in which the issue of
dischargeability arises and will therefore be briefly summarized. Grogan was awarded
a money judgment against Garner in a civil trial for common law fraud. Garner, 881
F.2d at 580. The jury was instructed on a preponderance of the evidence standard. Id.
Garner filed for relief under the Bankruptcy Code and requested that Grogan's judg-
ment against him be discharged. Id. Garner objected to the discharge based on Bank-
ruptcy Code section 523(a)(2) which denies a debtor a discharge from any debt ob-
tained under false pretenses, through a false representation, or actual fraud. Id. To
prove fraud, Grogan presented the civil court judgment to the bankruptcy court argu-
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fraud exception,1 the Court decided that a preponderance of the evi-
dence standard should be applied to all the exceptions to discharge.8
The Court's decision will obviously have an immediate effect on the
way that cases under this section are decided, however, there may be
broader, and perhaps more important, implications in the Court's deci-
sion. First, the decision will help ease the caseloads of the bankruptcy
courts which in a period of economic recession are seriously
overburdened.' Second, the decision reflects the relative importance
that the Court attaches to the "fresh start" policy embodied in the
Code as compared to the necessity of relitigating issues in the bank-
ruptcy court already decided in a state court.
The first step towards the debtor's "fresh start" is the filing of a
petition in bankruptcy. When an individual debtor' files a petition in
bankruptcy, he does so in hopes of obtaining a discharge." A discharge
relieves the debtor from all debts that arose prior to the filing of the
bankruptcy petition.' 2 The grant of a discharge is intended to give the
debtor a fresh start in life free from the burden of indebtedness.' 3
However, there are certain categories of debts which are nondischarge-
able. Among these are certain tax obligations,' payments of alimony
and child support,'6 repayment of educational loans,' 6 and debts in-
curred as a result of the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle while
ing that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded Garner from relitigating the issue
of fraud in the bankruptcy court. Id. The bankruptcy court agreed and declared the
debt nondischargeable. Id. The district court in an unreported decision affirmed. The
eighth circuit reversed, holding that in exceptions to discharge under section 523(a)(2)
fraud needs to be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and therefore, since the
standard in the civil trial was only a preponderance of the evidence, Garner was not
collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of fraud in the bankruptcy
court. Id. at 581-82.
7. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2).
8. Grogan, 111 S. Ct. at 661.
9. The caseload will be affected because the bankruptcy courts will be able to
apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to avoid relitigating issues that have been pre-
viously litigated in state court. See infra part VI.
10. Under the Code, the term "bankrupt" is abolished in favor of the term
"debtor". See 11 U.S.C. § 101(12).
11. B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL 1 3.01 (1986)
[hereinafter BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL].
12. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b).
13. BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 11, at 3.01.
14. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1).
15. § 523(a)(5).
16. § 523(a)(8).
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intoxicated. I" Non-compensatory fines and penalties owed to a govern-
mental unit are not dischargeable.18 Also debts not listed on the appro-
priate schedules, 19 or not discharged in a prior bankruptcy 20 are ex-
cepted from discharge. Because they involve intentional conduct on the
part of the debtor, the last exceptions are the most litigated,21 they
include debts incurred through various types of fraud22 or willful and
malicious injury. 3 It is the creditor's obligation to request that a par-
ticular debt owed to him not be discharged in bankruptcy.24 The credi-
tor who wishes to obtain a determination of nondischargeability in a
17. § 523(a)(9).
18. § 523(a)(7).
19. § 523(a)(3).
20. § 523(a)(10).
21. The basis for this statement is a finding during the research for this article
that the majority of cases reported involve the fraud and willful and malicious excep-
tions. The distinguishing factor between the fraud and willful and malicious exceptions
and the other exceptions is that the former involve intentional conduct on the part of
the debtor. Since intent is often difficult to establish, the standard of proof used to
establish this element will often play a decisive role in the outcome of the proceeding.
22. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)-(a)(4). The text of these sections is as follows:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or
1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any
debt-
(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refi-
nancing of credit, to the extent obtained by-
(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than
a statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial conditioi;
(B) use of a statement in writing-
(i) that is materially false;
(ii) respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition;
(iii) on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable for such
money, property, services, or credit reasonably relied; and
(iv) that the debtor caused to be made or published with intent to
deceive; or
(4) for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, em-
bezzlement, or larceny.
23. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). The text of this section is as follows:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of
this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt-
(6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or
to the property of another entity.
24. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(c); BANKR. R. 4007(a).
1991] 1413
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bankruptcy court25 must file a complaint to commence an adversary
proceeding.26
The standard of proof necessary to except a debt from discharge
had been the source of much controversy in the bankruptcy and appel-
late courts. With some courts following a preponderance of the evi-
dence standard and others following a clear and convincing standard,
both creditor and debtor were left in a state of confusion. 7 The issue of
the appropriate standard of proof usually arose in conjunction with ei-
ther the fraud2 8 or the willful and malicious injury 9 exceptions, al-
though there were a few cases involving the exception of debts incurred
through the operation of a motor vehicle while legally intoxicated."0 In
25. The Code requires that a creditor who wishes to have a debt declared nondis-
chargeable as one falling within the second, fourth, or sixth exception must bring the
action in the bankruptcy court within a specified amount of time. There is no time limit
for commencing an action to determine the dischargeability of a debt falling within one
of the other exceptions, and this may, in some instances, be determined by a state
court. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(c); BANKR. R. 4007.
26. BANKR. R. 4007(e), 7001(6).
27. The standard of proof utilized in dischargeability proceedings affects the cer-
tainty with which either party can predict the outcome of the proceeding. In deciding
whether to file a petition in bankruptcy, it is important for the debtor to know whether
he will receive a complete discharge. On the other hand, the certainty with which a
creditor feels he can prove the debt is nondischargeable will often determine whether
he files a complaint. If the debt the creditor is seeking to except from discharge is a
consumer debt, the certainty with which he can predict the outcome of the case has
special significance. If a creditor seeks to have a consumer debt declared nondischarge-
able, and such debt is discharged, the court may, at its discretion, award the debtor
costs and attorney's fees. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(d).
28. Fraud cases applying a preponderance of the evidence standard: see, e.g., In
re Glendenning, 107 Bankr. 136 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio. 1989); In re Basham, 106 Bankr.
453 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989); In re Showalter, 86 Bankr. 877 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1988);
In re Walters, 24 Bankr. 649 (Bankr. W.D. Penn. 1982).
Fraud cases applying the clear and convincing evidence standard: see, e.g., In re
King, 96 Bankr. 413 (D. Mass 1989); In re McQueen, 102 Bankr. 120 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1989); In re Zack, 99 Bankr. 717 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989); In re Adleman, 90
Bankr. 1012 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1988).
29. Wilfull and malicious cases applying a preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard: see, e.g., In re Martinez, 110 Bankr. 353 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990); In re Ziegler,
109 Bankr. 172 (Bankr. W.D. N.C. 1989); In re Meyer, 100 Bankr. 297 (Bankr. D.
S.C. 1988), aJffd 100 Bankr. 301 (D. S.C. 1989).
Wilfull and malicious cases applying a clear and convincing evidence standard:
see, e.g., In re Burke, 83 Bankr. 716 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1988); In re Auto Outlet, Inc.,
71 Bankr. 674 (Bankr. D. Utah 1987); In re Peoni, 67 Bankr. 288 (Bankr. S.D. Ind.
1986).
30. Drunk driving cases holding a preponderance of the evidence standard ap-
1414 [Vol. 15
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some districts, courts applied different standards of proof depending on
the exception to discharge at issue."
This article, by adopting the reasoning of the Supreme Court and
expanding upon its analysis, explains why the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard of proof is the correct standard to apply in section 523
proceedings. First, the article will describe the use of the different stan-
dards of proof and their origins. Next, it will look at the history of
discharge in bankruptcy and explain why, although discharge is a fun-
damental part of bankruptcy law, it is not so important as to justify the
imposition of a higher standard of proof than the preponderance stan-
dard normally applied in civil proceedings. From that point, the article
will examine the "fresh start" policy of the Code as a reason to con-
strue the Code's provisions against the creditor and in favor of the
debtor. Then, the article will argue that the reasons the courts of equity
required fraud to be proven by clear and convincing evidence are inap-
plicable in dischargeability proceedings. Finally, the benefits of the
doctrine of collateral estoppel will be discussed.
II. THE STANDARD OF PROOF: ITS USE AND ORIGIN
Up until the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Grogan, the
determination of the appropriate standard of proof to apply in proceed-
ings under section 523 was complicated by the fact that many bank-
ruptcy courts found it easier to avoid the issue rather than justify its
use of either standard. 2 In holding in favor of the debtor, some courts
simply stated that the plaintiff failed to prove its case by even a pre-
ponderance of the evidence,33 or did not mention a standard at all.34
plies: see, e.g., In re Middleton, 100 Bankr. 814 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988), affd sub
nom. Whitson v. Middleton, 898 F.2d 950 (4th Cir. 1990); In re Humphrey, 102
Bankr. 629 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989); In re Carney, 68 Bankr. 655 (Bankr. D. N.H.
1986).
Drunk driving cases in which the court utilized a heightened standard of proof:
see, e.g., In re Vorek, 95 Bankr. 599 (Bankr. S.D Ind. 1989) (strict proof); In re
Wright, 66 Bankr. 403 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1986) (clear and convincing evidence); In re
Christianson, 65 Bankr. 157 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986) (substantial evidence).
31. See, e.g., In re Feldman, 111 Bankr. 481 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990); In re Zack,
99 Bankr. 717.
32. See In re Middleton, 100 Bankr. 814. "The burden of proof under section
523(a) is a murky area of bankruptcy law where few clear rules, if any, have been
developed. In fact, many courts fail even to address this issue just as it has not been
addressed by the parties here." Id. at 817.
33. See In re Drake, 5 Bankr. 149, 151 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1980), overruled on
1991] 1415
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Courts deciding in favor of the creditor found that the case was proven
by clear and convincing evidence.3 5 Other courts, without explanation,
simply applied the higher standard. 36 Those courts that did attempt to
select one standard over the other, often confused the reader by utiliz-
ing "loose language" in describing the standard being applied. For in-
stance, courts presumably meaning to apply a preponderance standard
also used the term "fair preponderance"3 while courts applying the
clear and convincing standard used phrases such as "clear, cogent, and
convincing," "clear and conclusive," and "clear, unequivocal, and con-
vincing."38 The differing and varied expressions courts used in applying
the standard of proof made it difficult to establish a uniform rule.
Although at times it may be difficult to distinguish between the
two different standards of proof,3 9 the purpose of establishing different
other grounds, In re Shuler, 21 Bankr. 643 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1982) ("The preponder-
ance of the evidence does not establish . . . ."); In re Walker, 7 Bankr. 216, 219
(Bankr. D. R.I. 1980) ("[T]he plaintiff has proved neither by clear and convincing
evidence, nor a preponderance thereof. . . ."); see also In re Watkins, 90 Bankr. 848,
851, n.7 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988) ("Most courts, I surmise, do what the court in In re
Horldt, 86 Bankr. 823 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) did and 'punt'. They merely avoid the
issue by saying that the plaintiff has failed to meet even the lower standard. Until now
that is precisely what I have been able to do.").
34. See In re Maiolo, 12 Bankr. 114 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).
35, See In re Powell, 88 Bankr. 114 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988). "The grounds for
denial of discharge have been proven by clear and convincing evidence, though this
court is not satisfied that such a heightened evidentiary standard is either mandated by
the statute or appropriate to achieve the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code." Id. at 118.
36. In re Brink, 30 Bankr. 28, 30 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983); In re Ashley, 5
Bankr. 262, 264 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980) ("It must be proved by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence.").
37. In re Glendenning, 107 Bankr. 136; In re Dubian, 77 Bankr. 332 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1987); In re Clark, 50 Bankr. 122 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1985); In re Carr, 49 Bankr.
208 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985); In re Stephens, 26 Bankr. 389 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983).
38. See 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 468, p. 645 (1968). There are at
least twenty-five additional varieties of the clear and convincing standard listed in this
section.
39. Whereas the preponderance standard lends itself to a workable definition, the
clear and convincing standard does not. The preponderance standard has been defined
as:
[T]he evidence which, when weighed with that opposed to it as [sic] more
convincing force and is more probably true and accurate. If upon any issue
in the case, the evidence appears to be equally balanced, or if it cannot be
said upon which side it weighs heavier, then plaintiff has not met his or her
burden of proof.
In re Clark, 50 Bankr. at 125-26 (citing Smith v. United States, 726 F.2d 428 (8th
1416 [Vol. 15
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standards of proof should not be overlooked. "[T]he labels used for al-
ternative standards of proof [may be] vague and not a very sure guide
to decision-making,"40 but they nevertheless, "represent[] an attempt
to instruct the fact-finder concerning the degree of confidence our soci-
ety thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions."41
In this way, "[t]he standard serves to allocate the risk of error between
the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the
ultimate decision." '42 Thus, "when the individual interests at stake...
are both 'particularly important' and 'more substantial than the mere
loss of money,' -43 such as proceedings to terminate parental rights, the
Supreme Court has applied the clear and convincing evidence stan-
Cir. 1984)). There is no comparable definition to utilize in applying the clear and con-
vincing evidence standard. The bankruptcy courts have not come up with a workable
definition. Those that attempt to define it, simply say it requires evidence more convinc-
ing than a mere preponderance, but less convincing than beyond a reasonable doubt.
See In re Bonnett, 72 Bankr. 715, 717 (C.D. Ill. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 895
F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing In re Delano, 50 Bankr. 613, 617 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1985)) ("[T]he clear and convincing burden of proof standard creates a greater burden
of proof than the normal preponderance of the evidence standard.") Other courts have
indicated:
"[T]he term 'clear and convincing' does not lend itself to preciseness in
definition. It is pretty much a relative term. The measure of proof required
by this designation falls somewhere between the rule in ordinary civil cases
and the requirement of our criminal procedure, that is, it must be more
than a preponderance but not beyond a reasonable doubt. It is that mea-
sure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts
a firm belief or conviction as to the allegation sought to be established.
Evidence need not be voluminous or undisputed to accompany this."
Brown v. Warner, 78 S.D. 647, 653, 107 N.W.2d 1, 4 (1961) (citation omitted). At
least one bankruptcy court, in the case of In re Dubian, 77 Bankr. 332, has stated that
"terms such as 'clear and convincing' and 'not of doubtful character' are helpful in
emphasizing a careful approach to the decision of certain important issues, but are too
vague to serve generally as a practical guide in the trial of cases." Id. at 338 (citations
omitted). In holding that a preponderance of the evidence standard applied in proceed-
ings under sections 523(a)(2) and 523(a)(6), the court stated that an application of the
clear and convincing standard would be a pure abstraction and an unwarranted judicial
gloss on the statute." Id. at 339 (In footnote 5 of the court's opinion, it states that
"[t]he origin of a higher standard in dischargeability proceedings seems to be more the
result of some flowery language in the decisions than any sound analysis.").
40. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 369-70 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
41. Id.
42. Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (citing Add-
ington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)).
43. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982) (citing Addington, 441 U.S.
at 424).
1991] 1417
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dard."I However, as the Court noted in Grogan, where particularly im-
portant individual rights or interests are not at stake, the preponder-
ance of the evidence standard is presumed to be the standard
applicable in civil actions between private litigants.45 This is "[b]ecause
the preponderance of the evidence standard results in a roughly equal
allocation of the risk of error between the litigants. 46 It was therefore
necessary for the Court in Grogan to consider whether the right to a
discharge in bankruptcy approaches a constitutional level of impor-
tance, making it appropriate to apply a higher standard of proof in
section 523 proceedings than that of a preponderance of the evidence.
In considering this issue, the Court began by stating it had "previously
held that a debtor has no constitutional or 'fundamental' right to a
discharge in bankruptcy. 4 7 The Court then quickly disposed of the is-
sue by stating that "in the context of provisions designed to exempt
certain claims from discharge, [it does not believe] a debtor has an
interest in discharge sufficient to require a heightened standard of
proof." '48 From the Court's opinion, it is not exactly clear why the Jus-
tices do not believe a debtor has an interest in discharge sufficient to
require a heightened standard of proof. However, a closer look at the
history of discharge in bankruptcy and an expansion of the Court's
analysis may aid the reader in an understanding of the Court's position.
III. HISTORY OF DISCHARGE
In order to provide the debtor with a new opportunity in life, the
44. See Santosky, 455 U.S. 745 (proceeding to terminate parental rights); Add-
ington, 441 U.S. 418 (involuntary commitment proceeding); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S.
276 (1966) (deportation); Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990)
(withholding of nutrition and hydration from a person in a persistent vegetative state).
45. Grogan, 111 S. Ct. at 659. For cases where the Court has applied a prepon-
derance of the evidence standard, see Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574 (1987) (pater-
nity could be established by a preponderance of the evidence despite "serious economic
consequences" to the defendant); Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (establishment of securi-
ties fraud under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Steadman v.
SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981) (sanctions under the Investment Advisors Act, including per-
manently barring an individual from practicing his profession); SEC v. C.M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943) (establishment of securities fraad under section
17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933); United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37 (1914)
(proof of acts exposing a party to criminal prosecution).
46. Grogan, 111 S. Ct. at 659.
47. Id. (citing United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445-46 (1973)).
48. Id.
1418 [Vol. 15
8
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 16
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss3/16
Kessler
Code grants the debtor a discharge from his pre-petition debts.49 The
discharge of the debtor is the heart of the "fresh start" policy of the
Code.50 In order to appreciate the importance of the discharge in bank-
ruptcy, it is necessary to look back to its origin, its development
throughout the years, and its position today in bankruptcy law.
Bankruptcy law today, and at its inception, appears to have two
main objectives: to provide for an equitable distribution of an insolvent
debtor's property, and to prevent the insolvent debtor from acting in a
manner which is detrimental to the interests of his creditors. Protecting
the honest debtor from his creditors by means of a discharge, although
a fundamental feature in today's bankruptcy law, has not historically
been a feature of bankruptcy law.5 1 Early English bankruptcy law,
which provided the foundation for American bankruptcy law, was insti-
tuted for the benefit of the creditor.5 2 Not only did the early laws fail
to provide the debtor with a discharge from his debts, they allowed
creditors to involuntarily seize and distribute the debtor's property and
place him in prison. 51 Even the first discharge provision, which ap-
peared in an English bankruptcy law in 1705,11 was introduced for the
benefit of creditors; it was a way to induce debtors to disclose and de-
liver all their assets to their creditors.5 5 If the debtor honestly surren-
dered all his assets and cooperated fully with the creditors, he was
granted a discharge of the unpaid balance of his debts.56 A debtor that
failed to make a full disclosure was considered a felon and
imprisoned. 7
The first American bankruptcy laws followed the model of the
English laws. The Bankruptcy Act of 180058 provided for involuntary
49. 11 U.S.C. § 727.
50. See, H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 384, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6340.
51. See Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy law, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 223,
225 (1918).
52. Countryman, Bankruptcy and the Individual Debtor - and a Modest Propo-
sal to Return to the Seventeenth Century, 32 CATH. U.L. REv. 809, 813 (1983).
53. Id. at 811-12.
54. Id. at 812. (citing 4 Anne, Ch. 17 (1705)).
55. J. MAcLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 100 (1956).
56. When the law was first enacted, a discharge was granted only after approval
by all of the creditors. Later, it was amended so as to only require approval of a major-
ity of claims in number and amount. Note, Essentials of Bankruptcy: Prevention of
Fraud, and Control of Debtor, 23 VA. L. REV. 373, 380 (1937).
57. See Countryman, supra note 52, at 812.
58. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, Ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (1800) (repealed 1803).
1991) 1419
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proceedings to be initiated on creditors petitions only, and provided the
debtor with a discharge if he made a full disclosure to his creditors.
The discharge was conditioned on the debtor receiving the consent of
two-thirds of the creditors who had claims against two-thirds of the
total value of all outstanding debts.59 A failure to honestly disclose re-
sulted in the debtor's imprisonment for not less than one year, nor more
than ten years. 60 The position of the debtor gradually improved with
the enactment of the latter Bankruptcy Acts of 1841' and 1867.62
Under the 1867 Act, both voluntary and involuntary petitions could be
filed. Along with the discharge a debtor received by cooperating with
his creditors, he was granted certain limited exemptions in clothing,
furniture, and other necessaries.63 Also by this time, imprisonment for
debt was curtailed by many state constitutions and statutes.6 4
Under the 1898 Act," the debtor could file a voluntary petition
and would be granted a discharge, regardless of creditor consent, as
long as he acted in accordance with the Act's provisions. 66 As enacted,
the Act excepted certain debts from discharge. These included, among
others, debts incurred through fraud or for the willful and malicious
injury to the person or property of another.67 By including provisions in
the Act which except certain debts from discharge, it is evident that
Congress concluded the debtor was only entitled to a discharge when
he dealt honestly with his creditors. Although Congress limited the dis-
charge to a certain extent, it improved the debtor's position after bank-
ruptcy by granting debtors liberal exemptions. For the first time, states
were permitted to expand upon the exemptions granted by bankruptcy
law.68
With the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, and the addi-
tional allowances granted to the debtor therein, the original purpose of
the discharge, that of facilitating the liquidation of the debtors assets,
began to give way to the "fresh start" policy currently embodied in the
59. Countryman, supra note 52, at 813.
60. Id.
61. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, Ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (1841) (repealed 1843).
62. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, Ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (1867) (ropealed.1878).
63. Countryman, supra note 52, at 815.
64. Id. at 814.
65. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1978)
[hereinafter Bankruptcy Act].
66. Bankruptcy Act, § 14, 30 Stat. at 550.
67. Id. at § 17, 30 Stat. at 550.
68. Bankruptcy Act, § 6, 30 Stat. at 548.
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Code. The bankruptcy laws no longer served the interests of the credi-
tors to the detriment of the debtors.
[The new Act was] designed not only to distribute the property of
the debtor, not by law exempted, fairly and equally among his
creditors, but as a main purpose of the act, intends to aid the un-
fortunate debtor by giving him a fresh start in life, free from debts,
except of a certain character, after .the property which he owned at
the time of bankruptcy has been administered for the benefit of
creditors. Our decisions lay great stress upon this feature of the
law-as one not only of private but of great public interest in that it
secures to the unfortunate debtor, who surrenders his property for
distribution, a new opportunity in life."9
By following the development of discharge, one can see that the dis-
charge has become a fundamental part of bankruptcy law today. How-
ever, one "cannot allow the apparent importance of these rights in the
limited context of this area of the law to skew their opinions concerning
the relative importance of bankruptcy rights within the overall context
of the law.'7° It may be true that the debtor has a important personal
interest in obtaining a discharge,71 but the discharge remains a privi-
lege.72 As the Court noted in United States v. Kras,7 3 and later reiter-
ated in Grogan, there is no constitutional right to be relieved of one's
debts in bankruptcy. 74 In United States v. Kras, the Court denied the
debtor a "fresh start" by refusing to allow him to proceed in forma
pauperis so that he could receive a discharge of his debts. The Court
recognized that a discharge was important, but felt it did not reach the
same constitutional level of particularly important individual rights or
interests involved in other proceedings, which warranted a waiver of
69. Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1917) (citations omitted).
70. In re Watkins, 90 Bankr. at 857.
71. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445 (1973).
72. See In re Lah, 88 Bankr. 141, 145 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988); Hudson
County Welfare Dep't v. Roedel, 34 Bankr. 689, 694 (D. N.J. 1983), a fd, 734 F.2d 7
(3d Cir 1984).
73. Kras, 409 U.S 434.
74. See id. at 446.
75. Under the Bankruptcy Act, the payment of all bankruptcy fees was required
before a discharge could be granted. The policy is continued under the Code. See 11
U.S.C. § 707(a)(2) (The court may dismiss a case for nonpayment of any fees or
charges under chapter 123 of title 28).
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fees.7" Thus, the Court has found that a "[b]ankruptcy [discharge] is
hardly akin to free speech or marriage . . . which are imbedded in the
[f]irst [a]mendment, [and which] the Court has come to regard as fun-
damental. ' ' 77 Since the right to a discharge is not fundamentally impor-
tant, there is no compelling reason for moving away from the general
rule that in a "typical civil suit for money damages, plaintiffs must
prove their case by a preponderance of evidence."' 78 A proceeding under
section 523 is equivalent to a civil suit for money damages. The credi-
tor is simply trying to collect money he believes is owed to him by the
debtor. By excepting a particular debt from discharge, the court is
merely leaving the debtor "subject to the same risks and burdens of
any other debtor outside of bankruptcy. '79 Since in a discharge pro-
ceeding, the only interest of the debtor which is at stake is that of his
"economic freedom," an interest which is not afforded constitutional
protection, there is no basis for requiring a heightened standard of
proof.
IV. FRESH START POLICY
After deciding that a debtor does not have an interest in discharge
sufficient to require the clear and convincing evidence standard of
proof, the Grogan Court next addressed the "fresh start" policy of the
Code as a reason for applying a heightened standard of proof. One of
the principal reasons many courts held a clear and convincing evidence
standard was required to except a debt from discharge was a belief that
such a standard was necessary to preserve the debtor's "fresh start."
The Court stated that it was "unpersuaded by the argument that the
clear and convincing standard is required to effectuate the 'fresh start'
policy of the Bankruptcy Code."8 The Court does not point out exactly
76. See Kras, 409 U.S. at 444-45, where the Court compared a divorce proceed-
ing in which they allowed the payment of fees to be waived, in Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371 (1971), with a bankruptcy discharge. In a divorce proceeding the parties'
inability to dissolve their marriage seriously impairs their "freedom to pursue other
protected associational activities." Id. at 444-45. Whereas in a bankruptcy discharge,
the debtor's interest in eliminating the burden of his debt, and "in obtaining his desired
new start in life, although important and so recognized by the Bankruptcy Act, does
not rise to the same constitutional level." Id. at 445.
77. Id. at 446 (citations omitted).
78. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 387 (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 423).
79. In re Watkins, 90 Bankr. at 856.
80. Grogan, IIl S. Ct. at 659.
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which argument it is referring to, but there is one particular maxim
which the courts frequently used to back up their position:
"[E]xceptions to [discharge] should be strictly construed against the
objecting creditor and liberally in favor of the debtor."81 The maxim,
most likely gained popularity through a remark made by the Supreme
Court in Gleason v. Thaw,82 where the Court stated that "[i]n view of
the well-known purpose of the [b]ankrupt[cy] law, exceptions to the
operation of a discharge ... should be confined to those plainly ex-
pressed. '83 The Court in Gleason indicated that the bankruptcy courts
should not expand on the exceptions listed in the Bankruptcy Act.84 It
was not specifying the standard of proof required to prove an exception.
Thus, the maxim should not be applied to establish a standard of proof,
but rather should be utilized to determine whether the debt is of the
type which falls within the exception.85 The Court in Grogan recog-
81. See In re Foreman, 906 F.2d 123, 127-28 (5th Cir. 1990); see also In re Van
Horne, 823 F.2d 1285, 1287 (8th Cir. 1987); In re Klag, 112 Bankr. 456, 458 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1990); In re Liptack, 89 Bankr. 3, 4 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988); In re Perez,
94 Bankr. 765, 768 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988); In re Howard, 73 Bankr. 694, 700
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987).
82. Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558 (1915).
83. Id. at 562.
84. The issue before the Court was whether the professional services of an attor-
ney and counselor at law were property within the meaning of paragraph 2, section 17
of the Bankruptcy Act. Id. at 558. This section excepted "from the general release of a
discharge 'liabilities for obtaining property by false pretenses or false representa-
tions.'" Id. The Court concluded that Congress never intended the term property to
include professional services. Id. at 561.
85. See Combs v. Richardson, 838 F.2d 112, 116 (4th Cir. 1988) ("Although the
'fresh start' philosophy of bankruptcy law requires that exceptions to discharge 'be con-
fined to those plainly expressed'(citation omitted), this policy does not justify judicial
imposition of a heavier burden of proof on creditors .... "); see also In re Watkins,
90 Bankr. at 856:
However, I believe that the maxim is applicable only when construing the
breadth of a statutory exception to discharge and not to the quantum of
proof necessary to establish one of the factual elements of the cause of
action. A creditor may, for example, bring an action alleging that a certain
debt is nondischargeable under [section] 523(a)(6) and may prove all the
elements of the cause of action by a preponderance of the evidence, yet
such debt must be held to be dischargeable if the conduct alleged and
proven is not within the exception narrowly construed.
Id.; In re Wellever, 103 Bankr. 856, 861 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1989) ("[P]olicy is best
served by construing the scope of the exceptions narrowly, not by arbitrarily making
their proof more difficult.") (emphasis in original); 3 W. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
523.05A, at 523-16-17. (15th ed. 1979) ("In determining whether a particular debt
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nized that although bankruptcy law generally favors the granting of a
discharge,86 the Code should be construed to protect the debtor only in
those cases where there is no intent to violate its provisions. 87 "The
statutory provisions governing nondischargeability reflect a congres-
sional decision to exclude from the general policy of discharge certain
categories of debts ...Congress evidently concluded that the credi-
tors' interest in recovering full payment of debts in these categories
outweighed the debtors' interest in a complete fresh start."88 In other
words, the exceptions to discharge reflect "Congress' belief that debtors
do not merit a fresh start to the extent that their debts fall within
section 523."89 In a section 523 proceeding it is the debtor's honesty
that is called into question. Requiring a clear and convincing standard
of proof "tends to presume the very issue in question, namely the
debtor's honesty."90 It follows, therefore, that the Court's reasoning is
correct when it states that "[r]equiring the creditor to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that his claim is not dischargeable re-
flects a fair balance between [the] conflicting interests"9' of the debtor
and the creditor. Applying a clear and convincing standard would ex-
press a preference for the debtor, 92 and "it is unlikely that Congress, in
fashioning the standard of proof that governs the applicability of [the
nondischargeability] provisions, would have favored the interest in giv-
ing perpetrators of fraud a fresh start over the interest in protecting
victims of fraud."93
falls within one of the exceptions of section 523, the statute should be strictly con-
strued against the objecting creditor and liberally in favor of the debtor.") (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
86. See Grogan, 111 S. Ct. at 659 ("[A] central purpose of the Code is to pro-
vide a procedure by which certain insolvent debtors can reorder their affairs, make
peace with their creditors, and enjoy 'a new opportunity in life with a clear field for
future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.' ").
87. See id. ("But in the same breath that we have invoked this 'fresh start' pol-
icy, we have been careful to explain that the Act limits the opportunity for a com-
pletely unencumbered new beginning to the 'honest but unfortunate debtor.' ").
88. Id.
89. In re Braen, 900 F.2d 621, 625 (3d Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original) (cita-
tion omitted).
90. In re Powell, 88 Bankr. at 118.
91. Grogan, 111 S. Ct. at 659.
92. See Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 390 ("Any other standard expresses a prefer-
ence for one side's interests"). See also Combs, 838 F.2d at 116 (referring to a debt
under section 523(a)(6), but it applies equally to all section 523 proceedings).
93. Huddleston, 459 U.S at 390.
1424 [Vol. 15
14
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 16
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss3/16
Kessler
V. PROOF OF FRAUD
Where the exception to discharge requires proof of fraud, some
courts required clear and convincing evidence because they believed
this was the prevailing standard, for both section 523 and common law
purposes, at the time of the Code's adoption .1 4 The Court rejected this
idea. "Because it seems clear that a preponderance of the evidence is
sufficient to establish [some of] the nondischargeability"'95 exceptions,
the court reasoned that "the structure of section 523(a), which groups
together in the same subsection a variety of exceptions without any in-
dication that any particular exception is subject to a special standard of
proof' 96 supports the conviction that Congress intended the preponder-
ance standard to apply to all the exceptions, including those involving
fraud.
In addition to the reason given by the Supreme Court, there are
other persuasive arguments for not applying a higher standard of proof
to the fraud exceptions. The bankruptcy court case, In re Huff,97 was
frequently cited for the rationale behind making a creditor prove by
"clear and convincing" evidence that a debt falling within the section
523(a)(2) exception is nondischargeable.98 That court ruled that where
dishonesty or fraud is at issue, a higher standard of proof is required to
overcome the presumption that all men are honest and fair dealing.99
The court in Huff, quoting from section 94 of Corpus Juris Secundum,
stated that the higher standard is based on considerations that "fraud
is regarded as criminal in its essence, and involves moral turpitude at
least, while, on the other hand, the presumption is that all men are
honest, that individuals deal fairly and honestly, that private transac-
tions are fair and regular, and that participants act in honesty and good
faith." 100 There are two problems with the court's reliance on section
94. In re Garner, 881 F.2d at 582.
95. Grogan, 111 S. Ct. at 660.
96. Id. at 659-660.
97. In re Huff, 1 Bankr. 354 (Bankr. D. Utah 1979).
98. See, e.g., In re Lowther, 32 Bankr. 638, 641 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983); In re
Trewyn, 12 Bankr. 543, 545 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1981).
99. In re Huff, I Bankr. at 357; See In re Garcia, 88 Bankr. 695 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1988) (this case was decided under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2), but referred to section
523(a) proceedings); In re Auto Outlet, Inc., 71 Bankr. 674; In re Lowther, 32 Bankr.
638; In re lannelli, 12 Bankr. 561 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1981); In re Trewyn, 12 Bankr.
543.
100. In re Huff, 1 Bankr. at 357, quoting from 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 94, p. 398 et
seq. (1943) (citations omitted).
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94 to support its proposition. First, the cited section deals with impos-
ing the burden of proof on the one alleging fraud, it mentions nothing
about a "clear and convincing" standard of proof.10 1 Second, the pre-
sumption of fair dealing does not justify the imposition of a higher
standard of proof than that normally applied in civil cases. The pre-
sumption can be overcome "by producing facts and circumstances in
evidence which cannot fairly or reasonably be reconciled with fair deal-
ing and honesty of purpose."102
The original reason for which the clear and convincing evidence
standard was created by the courts of equity is inapplicable to section
523 proceedings. The Supreme Court has recognized that the "clear
and convincing" standard of proof was created by the courts of equity
for a particular class of claims.
A higher standard of proof apparently arose in courts of equity
when the chancellor faced claims that were unenforceable at law
because of the Statute of Wills, the Statute of Frauds, or the parol
evidence rule. Concerned that claims would be fabricated, the
chancery courts imposed a more demanding standard of proof. The
higher standard subsequently received wide acceptance in equity
proceedings to set aside presumptively valid written instruments on
account of fraud.1 0 3
An article cited by the Supreme Court in Huddleston states that "[t]he
101. In fact, a later section of C.J.S. entitled "weight and sufficiency," states
that fraud need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence:
Fraud must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Although a
court or jury should be cautious in arriving at conclusions prejudicial to
character and honesty, a preponderance of evidence such as required in
civil cases generally is ordinarily sufficient to show fraud, provided the
proof is clear and strong enough to preponderate over the general and rea-
sonable presumption that men are honest and do not ordinarily commit
fraud or act in bad faith.
37 C.J.S. Fraud § 114, p.4 2 6-2 7 (1943) (citations omitted).
102. 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 470 p.649 (1968) (citations omitted).
Requiring the "clear and convincing" standard to overcome the presumption of honesty
has also been attacked on another level. In In re Watkins, 90 Bankr. at 852 n.9, Judge
Spector, intrigued with why some courts had such solicitude for the feelings of the
allegedly dishonest, admitted it would hurt to be called a fraud or a cheat; but then
asked whether it was less hurtful to be called a murderer, rapist, or vandal. If not, he
posited, "then there is no good reason to require clear and convincing evidence in cases
of 'dishonesty' but not in cases of other sorts of depravity." Id.
103. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 388 n.27 (citations omitted).
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requirement in civil actions of more than a preponderance of the evi-
dence was first applied in equity to claims which experience had shown
to be inherently subject to fabrication, lapse of memory, or the flexibil-
ity of conscience." 104 The adversary proceedings brought under section
523(a)(2) for debts obtained by false pretenses, false representations,
or actual fraud are not the type of claims which the courts of equity
were concerned about when they developed the clear and convincing
evidence standard. First, since debts have to be confirmed by the bank-
ruptcy court prior to the holding of a hearing to determine their dis-
chargeability, 10 5 the danger that the facts of fraud claims will be
fabricated or subject to a lapse of memory, is minimal. Second, in ap-
plying the clear and convincing evidence standard to actions seeking to
set aside the terms of written instruments, the courts of equity were
concerned with protecting the validity of written instruments and the
reliance placed upon such documents. Since in dischargeability pro-
ceedings, the validity of written agreements is rarely an issue, and since
the claims in these proceedings are no more likely to be fabricated than
in other types of proceedings, the clear and convincing standard is
inappropriate.
VI. CLEAR AND CONVINCING STANDARD APPLIED BY
"ACCIDENT"
One issue which was not addressed by the Grogan Court, but
should not be overlooked, is the manner in which some of the lower
courts came to apply the clear and convincing evidence standard. The
courts which applied a clear and convincing standard did so "almost by
historical accident." 06 The historical accident, according to Judge
Stewart's opinion in In re Curl,107 was the result of courts citing to
cases that did not stand for the proposition stated. For instance, in
Sweet v. Ritter Finance Co., 08 a case which is repeatedly cited on the
elements of fraud and the burden of proof in dischargeability proceed-
ings, the court unequivocally stated that the elements must be proven
104. Note, Appellate Review in the Federal Courts of Findings Requiring More
than a Preponderance of the Evidence, 60 HARV. L. REv. 111, 112 (1946).
105. See I1 U.S.C. § 502.
106. See In re Curl, 49 Bankr. 302, 304 (Bankr. W.D. Miss. 1985).
107. Id.
108. Sweet v. Ritter Fin. Co., 263 F.Supp. 540, 543 (W.D. Va. 1967).
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by a preponderance of evidence. 09 However, numerous cases cited
Sweet for the proposition that the standard of proof is clear and con-
vincing evidence.110 In fact, at least two circuit court opinions, which
are supposed to serve as binding precedent for the bankruptcy courts,
adopted the clear and convincing standard of proof by citing to cases
which relied on Sweet."' Another circuit court opinion, which applied
a clear and convincing standard, cited to a bankruptcy court decision
which did not even mention the standard of proof."12 Perhaps the clear-
est episode of misstating a proposition was done by the court in In re
Pallo."3 In this case, the court stated "[i]t is unquestioned that the
party seeking to have its debt excepted from discharge pursuant to
[s]ection 523 bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evi-
dence.""' 4 To support its statement, the court cited two bankruptcy
court cases which unequivocally held that a fair preponderance of evi-
dence is all that is required to except a debt from discharge." 5 The fact
that these courts applied the clear and convincing standard by "acci-
dent" lends further support to the Supreme Court's adoption of the
preponderance standard.
VII. APPLICATION OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
Applying a preponderance of the evidence standard to proceedings
under section 523(a) will allow bankruptcy courts to give prior state
109. Id. at 543 ("In other words, Ritter Finance must show by a preponderance
of the evidence that . . ").
110. In re Aldrich, 16 Bankr. 825, 828 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982); In re Ashley, 5
Bankr. at 266; In re Jones, 3 Bankr. 410, 412 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980).
111. See Kimzey, 761 F.2d at 424 (citing In re Aldrich, 16 B.R. at 828); In re
Martin, 761 F.2d 1163, 1165 (6th Cir. 1985) (citing In re Jones, 3 Bankr. at 412).
112. See Rebhan, 842 F.2d at 1262 (citing In re Wise, 6 Bankr. 867 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1980). The court in Wise simply states that the creditor has the burden of
proof.
113. In re Pallo, 65 Bankr. 101 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1986).
114. Id. at 103 (emphasis added).
.115. See In re Carr, 49 Bankr. at 210 (The "party seeking to have its debt ex-
cepted from discharge pursuant to section 523 bears the burden of proof by the fair
preponderance of evidence."); In re Baiata, 12 Bankr. 813, 817 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y.
1981) ("[T]he correct standard of proof in [section] 523 dischargeability proceedings
in this district is a fair preponderance of the evidence.").
In addition to these two cases, the court cited two other cases which do not even
mention the standard of proof. See Hunt, 292 U.S. 234; In re Maiolo, 12 Bankr. 114.
The court also cited In re Martin, 761 F.2d 1163, a case which misapplied Sweet.
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court judgments preclusive effect, thereby avoiding duplicative relitiga-
tion of identical issues. The doctrine of collateral estoppel or "issue pre-
clusion" bars relitigation of issues in a subsequent proceeding which
were actually litigated in a previous adjudication. 116 The application of
collateral estoppel in bankruptcy cases was left open in Brown v. Fel-
sen"1 7 where the court stated that "[i]f in the course of adjudicating a
state-law question, a state court should determine factual issues using
standards identical to those of [section] 17, then collateral estoppel, in
the absence of countervailing statutory policy, would bar relitigation of
those issues in the bankruptcy court." ' There is no countervailing
statutory policy which would preclude the application of collateral es-
toppel in dischargeability proceedings:
The application of a collateral estoppel bar obviously serves impor-
tant interests. These interests do not disappear simply because the
subsequent proceedings are in bankruptcy. Judicial resources are
always conserved by avoiding duplicative relitigation of identical
issues . . . There is also no reason here to prefer the fact-finding of
a bankruptcy judge to that of a jury so long as the same issue was
presented in each proceeding."11 9
In Grogan, the Court clarified any confusion which existed by expressly
stating "that collateral estoppel principles do indeed apply in discharge
exception proceedings."' 20 Although collateral estoppel can properly be
applied in dischargeability proceedings, if the standard of proof used to
establish the requisite elements of the cause of action in state court is
lower than the applicable standard in bankruptcy cases, then the bank-
ruptcy court cannot give the state court judgment preclusive effect.' 2'
116. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94-95 (1980).
117. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979).
118. Id. at 139 n.10. (the reference to section 17 is to section 17 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898, which is essentially the same as section 523 under the Code). In
Brown, the Court decided that the doctrine of res judicata should not apply in dis-
chargeability proceedings because of the exclusive jurisdiction granted to the bank-
ruptcy courts by the 1970 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act to decide dis-
chargeability issues. Brown, 442 U.S. at 138-39.
119. Combs, 838 F.2d at 115 (citation omitted).
120. Grogan, II S. Ct. at 658 n. 11.
121. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28, p. 27 3 (1982) which
provides:
Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final
judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, relitigation
1991] 1429
19
Kessler: Exceptions to Discharge: The Supreme Court Adopts A Preponderance
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
Since in most civil proceedings the standard of proof is a preponder-
ance of the evidence, a state court judgment presented to the bank-
ruptcy court will, more likely than not, have been decided under a pre-
ponderance standard. Although it is true that many states require a
higher standard in cases involving fraud,122 there is still a significant
of the issue in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded in
the following circumstances:
(4) The party against whom preclusion is sought had a significantly heav-
ier burden of persuasion with respect to the issue in the initial action than
in the subsequent action; the burden has shifted to his adversary; or the
adversary has a significantly heavier burden than he had in the first action.
122. Marcus v. Fox, 150 Ariz. 342, 344, 723 P.2d 691, 693 (1985); Ficor, Inc., v.
McHugh, 639 P.2d 385, 396 (Colo. 1982); Connell v. Colwell, 214 Conn. 242, -, 571
A.2d 116, 121 (1990) (evidence must be clear, precise, and unequivocal); Hercules &
Co., v. Shama Restaurant Corp., 566 A.2d 31, 39 (D.C. App. 1989); Hawaii's Thou-
sand Friends v. Anderson, 70 Haw. 276, -, 768 P.2d 1293, 1295 (1989); Magic Val-
ley Potato Shippers v. Continental Ins., 112 Idaho 1073, 1076, 739 P.2d 372, 375
(1987); Hofmann v. Hofmann, 94 Ill.2d 205, 222, 446 N.E.2d 499, 506 (1983); Stauth
v. Brown, 241 Kan. 1, 9, 734 P.2d 1063, 1064 (1987); Alvey v. Union Inv. Inc., 697
S.W.2d 145, 147 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985); Hall v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 368 So. 2d
984, 992 (La. 1979) (fraud must be established by legal and convincing evidence);
Butler v. Poulin, 500 A.2d 257, 260 n.5 (Me. 1985); Everett v. Baltimore Gas and
Elec. Co., 307 Md. 286, 303, 513 A.2d 882, 891 (1986); Hi-Way Motor Co. v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co., 398 Mich. 330, 336, 247 N.W.2d 813, 816 (1976); Anderson v.
Burt, 507 So. 2d 32, 37 (Miss. 1987); Gibson v. Smith 422 S.W.2d 321, 327 (Mo.
1968); Fletcher v. Mathew, 233 Neb. 853, 858-59, 448 NW.2d 576, 581 (1989);
Hindenes v. Whitney, 101 Nev. 175, 178, 697 P.2d 932, 933 (1985); Calendonia, Inc.
v. Trainor, 123 N.H. 116, 123, 459 A.2d 613, 617 (1983); Stochastic Decisions, Inc. v.
DiDomenico, 236 N.J. Super. 388, 395, 565 A.2d 1133, 1137 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1989); Treider v. Doherty and Co., 86 N.M. 735, 737, 527 P.2d 498, 500 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied 86 N.M. 730, 527 P.2d 493 (1974); Chopp v. Welbourne
& Purdy Agency, Inc., 135 A.D.2d 958, 959, 522 N.Y.S.2d 367, 363-69 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1987); Porter v. Fridley, 373 N.W.2d 917, 920 (N.D. 1985) (clear, satisfactory,
and convincing); Tice v. Tice, 672 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Okla. 1983); Galego v. Knudsen,
282 Or. 155, 165, 578 P.2d 769, 775-76 (1978) (clear, satisfactory, and convincing);
Snell, D.D.S. v. State Examining Bd., 490 Pa. 277, 281, 416 A.2d 468, 470 (1980)
(clear, precise, and convincing); First State Savings and Loan v. Phelps, 299 S.C. 441,
447, 385 S.E.2d 821, 824 (1989) (clear, cogent, and convincing); Bezner v. Continental
Dry Cleaners, 548 P.2d 898 (Utah 1976); Estate of Raedel, 152 Vt. 478, 485, 568
A.2d 331, 334 (1989); Elliot v. Shore Stop, Inc., 238 Va. 237, 244, 384 S.E.2d. 752,
756 (1989); Adams v. Allen, 56 Wash. App. 383, 393, 783 P.2d 635. 640 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1989) (clear, cogent, and convincing); Tri-State Asphalt Prod. v. McDonough
Co., 391 S.E.2d 907, 912 (W. Va. 1990); Lundin v. Shimanski, 124 \Vis. 2d 175, 184,
368 N.W.2d 676, 680 (1985); Duffy v. Brown, 708 P.2d 433, 437 (Wyo. 1985) (clear,
unequivocal, and convincing).
1430 [Vol. 15
20
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 16
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss3/16
Kessler
number of states that only require a preponderance of the evidence to
prove fraud.'2 To require a higher standard in dischargeability cases
would often require that the holder of a state court judgment retry the
entire case in a bankruptcy court. This would be an "unnecessary exer-
cise in judicial machinery. "124
In addition to state court judgments which would have to be reliti-
gated, a clear and convincing standard of proof would require that
judgments awarded under important federal non-bankruptcy laws,
which only require a preponderance of the evidence to prove fraud, be
relitigated.12 5 For instance, fraud actions brought by the United States
under the False Claims Act 2 6 only require the claim be established by
a preponderance of the evidence. 2 7 Congress also expressly provided
that the preponderance standard applies to civil penalties for fraud in-
volving financial institutions. 128 In addition, courts have judicially
123. Purcell Co. v. Spriggs Enterprises, Inc., 431 So. 2d 515, 519 (Ala. 1983)
(intent to defraud must be clearly proved by a preponderance of the evidence); Saxton
v. Harris, 395 P.2d 71, 72 (1964); Lancaster v. Schilling Motors, Inc., 299 Ark. 365,
367, 772 S.W.2d 349, 350 (1989); Lindoas v. Sahadi, 19 Cal. 3d 278, 289, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 635, 641, 562 P.2d 316, 322 (1977); NYE Odorless Incineration Corp. v. Felton,
35 Del. 236, 252, 162 A. 504, 509 (1931); Wieczoreck v. H & H Builders, 475 So. 2d
227, 228 (Fla. 1985); City Dodge, Inc. v. Gardner, 232 Ga. 766, 770, 208 S.E.2d 794,
798 (1974); Plymale v. Upright, 419 N.E.2d 756, 759 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Robinson
v. Perpetual Serv. Corp., 412 N.W.2d 562, 565 (Iowa 1987) (fraud must be established
by a preponderance of the clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence); Briggs v. Carol
Cars, Inc., 407 Mass. 391, 393, 553 N.E.2d 930, 932 (1989); Sievert v. LaMarca, 367
N.W.2d 580, 589 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Rother v. Hiniker, 208 Minn. 405, 407, 294
N.W. 644, 645 (1940) ("Civil actions require proof of fraud by a fair preponderance of
the evidence."); Batten v. Watts Cycle and Marine, Inc., 240 Mont. 113, 117, 783 P.2d
378, 380 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1826 (1990); Manyard v. Durham and South-
ern Ry. Co., 112 S.E.2d 249, 252 (N.C. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 365 U.S. 160
(1961) (in an action to set aside a written instrument based on fraud "the burden of
proof to establish such allegation is by the preponderance or greater weight of the
evidence."); Manning v. Len Immke Buick, Inc., 28 Ohio App. 2d 203, 207-08, 276
N.E.2d 253 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971); Ostalkiewicz v. Guardian Alarm, 520 A.2d 563,
568 (R.I. 1987); Wise v. Thompson, 540 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976);
Piccadilly Square v. Intercontinenial Constr. Co., 782 S.W.2d 178, 183-(Tenn. Ct.
App. 1989); Delany v. Delany, 402 N.W.2d 701, 705 (S.D. 1987).
124. In re Daboul, 85 Bankr. 197, 201 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988).
125. See Grogan, 111 S. Ct. at 660 ("Unlike a large number, and perhaps the
majority, of the States, Congress has chosen the preponderance standard when it has
created substantive causes of action for fraud.").
126. 31 U.S.C. § 3729.
127. See 31 U.S.C. § 3731(c).
128. See 12 U.S.C.A § 1833a(e) (West 1989).
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adopted the preponderance of the evidence standard for other federal
antifraud statutes. 29
VIII. CONCLUSION
As the nation moves into a period of economic recession and the
number of bankruptcy filings continues to rise, the Court's adoption of
a preponderance of the evidence standard for section 52:3 proceedings
will avoid wasteful litigation. Persons who have successfully litigated
claims under the preponderance standard in state court actions will be
able to utilize the doctrine of collateral estoppel in a bankruptcy court.
Repeated actions will not have to be brought by the government, or
individuals, who have won judgments under a federal antifraud stat-
ute.13 0 Currently, the government, in hopes of recovering large mone-
tary judgments, is filing numerous lawsuits against persons accused of
defrauding federal savings and loan institutions. Should the govern-
ment be successful with these lawsuits, and if any of the "accused"
subsequently file a petition in bankruptcy (a very good possibility due
to the large sums of money involved), the government will be able to
avoid relitigating these cases in bankruptcy court, because the original
judgments, as well as the dischargeability proceeding, will be based
upon the preponderance of the evidence standard. Adoption of a higher
standard would force the government to retry these types of cases and
would result in an extreme waste of the taxpayers' money. This could
not have been what Congress intended in prescribing the preponder-
ance standard for these federal antifraud statutes. The application of a
clear and convincing standard in federal bankruptcy dischargeability
proceedings, While maintaining a preponderance standard for other fed-
eral antifraud laws, would cause a conflict in federal law.131 Adoption
129. See Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 390 (preponderance standard applies in cases
brought under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Commission Rule 10-
b(5)); Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 731 (2d Cir. 1987) (preponderance standard
applies in civil actions brought under the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act); First Nat'l Monetary Corp. v. Weinberger, 819 F.2d 1334, 1340 (6th Cir.
1987) (preponderance standard applies in actions brought under the fraud provisions of
the Commodity Exchange Act).
130. See supra, notes 126-28.
131. See Grogan, 111 S. Ct. at 658 n.10. Noting that dischargeability was a
matter of federal law, the Court explained that prior to 1970 the bankruptcy courts
and the state courts had concurrent jurisdiction to decide the dischargeability of debts.
However, with the enactment of the 1970 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
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of a preponderance of the evidence standard, on the other hand, avoids
the conflict. In addition, it allows bankruptcy courts to apply the princi-
ples of collateral estoppel in dischargeability proceedings and thereby
avoid wasteful and costly litigation of issues already decided by other
courts.
Andrew Kessler
the bankruptcy courts were granted exclusive jurisdiction over certain dischargeability
exceptions, including the exceptions for fraud.
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